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Abstract 
This paper tries to illustrate the possible impact of macroeconomic policies on exchange rate 
fluctuations of the recent years in Armenia. In particular, it speculates that the rapid appreciation 
of 2004-2005 came as a reaction to earlier policy-driven undervaluation of the exchange rate. 
Undervaluation of the exchange rate in 2002-2003 may have been caused by policies that deviated 
from its inflation objective and by massive government savings, which contributed to excessive 
foreign reserve accumulation. The following shift in policies back to low inflation objective and 
less ambitious fiscal saving scenario could have triggered rapid adjustments of the exchange rates. 
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1. Introduction 
While exchange rate appreciation seems a rational response to the dynamics of economic 
fundamentals, the scope and the speed of the appreciation in 2004-2005 still raises many 
questions. If economic fundamentals were driving the development of the exchange rate 
than it is not clear why appreciation did not start earlier and why it was so drastic.  
This paper examines whether economic policies or the inter-temporal policy choices could 
have affected the dynamics of the exchange rate. It speculates that both nominal and real 
appreciation could have started earlier but were prevented by the mix of policies leading to 
undervalued exchange rate. Two policy factors were identified that could contribute to 
excessive foreign exchange accommodation and nominal and, perhaps, real 
undervaluation: (i) changing priorities and higher tolerance of the Central Bank to 
inflation in 2002-2003 and (ii) lower Government deficit and resulting massive deposit 
accumulation that stimulated Central Bank’s foreign exchange accommodation above 
projections. Subsequently, the following reversal of this unusual policy behavior to its 
traditional stance, i.e. low inflation preferences and less fiscal savings caused adjustment 
in exchange rate toward appreciation. 
The paper is build into the following logic. First, the problem is formulated by describing 
the relationship between policy stance and exchange rate, concluding that the beginning of 
appreciation was triggered by the reversal in foreign exchange policy. Then, the changes 
in foreign exchange accommodation are discussed in the under the assumptions of Central 
Bank’s changing tolerance to inflation and volatile dynamics of Government surpluses. 
The paper considers that the higher inflation of 2003 / 2004 as driven not only by the 
external shock, but also as an outcome of expansionary monetary policy and resulting 
undervalued exchange rate. The undervaluation of exchange rate could have also been 
provoked by massive deposit accumulation by the Government and associated rapid 
reserve accumulation by the Central Bank. 
The third section tests the hypotheses about the effectively changing monetary policy 
objectives and claims that acceleration of inflation in 2003 and the later disinflation were 
policy driven phenomena. It also analyzes the link between inflation and exchange rate, 
arguing that acceleration of inflation is associated with undervalued exchange rate while 
disinflation was associated with exchange rate appreciation. The following section 
discusses the impact of the wheat price shock on inflation by drawing on analysis of CPI 
dynamics and relative price developments. Further, possible reasons for varying policies 
are discussed. The final section looks at the possible future developments of the exchange 
rate in the framework of inter-temporal fiscal policy choice. 
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2. Policy context for the exchange rate fluctuations 
The dynamics of economic fundamentals, in particular productivity growth and external 
environment suggest that Armenia should be experiencing real exchange rate appreciation. 
Since inflation is usually at low one digit, the real exchange rate is likely to appreciate 
through nominal appreciation. While it is widely recognized that economic fundamentals 
should have led to real and nominal appreciation, there are still open questions about the 
volatility of the exchange rate and the timing of the appreciation: the exchange rate 
appreciation was not smooth as could have been expected from the dynamic of the 
economic fundamentals. 
There is certain ambiguity about the dynamics of nominal exchange rate and particularly 
about when the recent nominal appreciation started. This is mainly due to the volatility of 
USD/EURO exchange rates in international markets and the large diversion in USD/AMD 
and EURO/AMD exchange rate trends in recent years (Chart 1). The effective nominal 
exchange rate2, however, shows that exchange rate appreciation started in early 2004.   
The reasons why nominal exchange rate was depreciating before 2004 are not 
conspicuous. One explanation for the real exchange rate depreciation in this period is that 
it was caused by the appreciation of Russian Ruble, or, in other words, higher inflation in 
Russia drove AMD real depreciation3. Similarly, the drastic appreciation that begun in 
2004 is difficult to interpret in terms of macroeconomic environment. Although BoP 
inflows, mainly private transfers, accelerated in the second half of 2004, they could not be 
the reason for the appreciation, which begun two quarters earlier (Chart 6). 
To explore the possible policy impact on the exchange rate we need to consider the 
monetary policy stance in terms of accommodation of foreign flows by examining the 
foreign exchange interventions of the Central Bank. Unfortunately, the interpretation of 
these data is not straightforward. The term “foreign exchange interventions” in official 
literature4 describes Central Bank’s intervention in inter-bank market only (presented in 
Chart 2). Still, this indicator only partly describes the scope of Central Bank’s 
participation in foreign exchange market as it excludes Government related foreign 
exchange accommodation. Therefore, the “foreign exchange interventions” data cannot be 
used for accurately describing the full scope of absorption of the BoP flows and their 
liquidity impact. 
                                                     
2 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, 2005. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Central Bank of Armenia, Annual Reports. 
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To fully capture the impact of Central Bank’s foreign exchange operations on the liquidity 
and BoP flows, a modified indicator for the foreign exchange operations is introduced, 
which includes transactions with the Government as well. Namely, in addition to inter-
bank operations, this indicator accounts for net Government related foreign exchange 
purchases defined in official literature as “conversions” of Government related foreign 
exchange receipts minus change in Treasury deposits in the Central Bank (quarterly data 
presented in Chart 3 and quarterly annualized – in Chart 4). The advantage of this 
indicator is that it shows the scope of reserve accumulation with direct liquidity impact. 
As the data indicate, the shift from aggressive intervention scenario to less intervention 
scenario coincides with the beginning of exchange rate appreciation (Charts 3 and 4). The 
exchange rate seems to be very sensitive to changes in foreign exchange intervention. This 
can be explained by the fact that BoP flows were relatively stable in this period5 (Chart 6) 
and fluctuations in the exchange rate can be attributed to the changes in policy parameters. 
It can be speculated that had the Central Bank changed its policy earlier, the exchange rate 
appreciation would have started earlier, and the opposite6. 
The reminder of the paper will try to analyze two possible reasons for instability in foreign 
exchange interventions: (i) changing tolerance to inflation and resulting changing 
monetary targets; and (ii) Government surpluses that might have affected foreign 
exchange accommodation potential of the Central Bank. These factors are described in the 
reminder of this section and further analyzed in the following section.   
Changing tolerance to inflation: The scope of foreign exchange operations is a 
direct function of the money supply, since foreign exchange operations have 
traditionally been the main monetary instrument (Chart 5). At the same time the 
growth pattern of the money supply7 has been very unstable in the recent years: 
while in 2002-2003, growth rate of money supply was very high, exceeding 40 
percent, in 2004 it was low one digit (Chart 7). Is the varying dynamics of money and 
foreign exchange interventions an indication that the Central Bank had different 
objectives in different time-periods? The stated objective of the Central Bank of 
maintaining 3 percent CPI inflation has remained unchanged in the recent years. Nor 
                                                     
5 It is interesting that even the end of the flows from Lincy foundations in the Q4 of 2003 
did not cause major fluctuations in BoP as they were fully compensated by an increase in 
private transfers. 
6 Unfortunately this relationship could not be illustrated quantitatively since the data on 
interventions is in quarterly frequency, thus not allowing a sufficient number of 
observations for a regression model. 
7 Dram broad money, defined as Broad Money minus foreign exchange deposits 
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is the unusual acceleration of inflation in 2003 a direct indication of the Central 
Bank’s deviation from its policy objectives as, according to the Central Bank, the 
2003 price hikes were caused by the drastic increase in international wheat prices that 
contributed almost 6 percentage points to inflation bringing it to around 9 percent in 
late 2003-mid 20048.  
The claim about changing policy objectives would be valid if there were indications 
that the monetary policy was in fact expansionary in 2003 and it would cause higher 
than 3 percent inflation without the wheat price shock. The following section will 
argue that the monetary expansion was crucial in transforming the shock to the CPI 
inflation. This implies that would there be no supply shock, money expansion would 
lead to higher than projected inflation.  
Government surpluses: The underlying approach is that the scope of foreign 
exchange operations and their impact on the exchange rate is not limited by 
quantitative monetary targets only but it also depends on the fiscal position9. In 
particular, because of lower than projected fiscal deficits, the Government was 
experiencing “surprise surpluses”10 since 2002 that were resulting in massive deposit 
accumulation in the Central Bank. These fiscal developments significantly 
contributed to the stabilization of macro-environment by restraining inflation and 
economic growth rates and thus helping to prevent overheating in the period of 
double-digit economic growth. On the other hand, the accumulated fiscal savings 
became important tools that could be used to stimulate aggregate demand when the 
external environment would be less positive and growth would slow down. In other 
words these savings may play a role of stabilization funds through which extra 
benefits from good years could be used at less favorable times in the future. 
From monetary management perspective, these fiscal developments helped the 
Central Bank to accumulate reserves, as unexpected liquidity drainage by the 
Government and decline in the Central Bank’s Net Domestic Assets had to be 
substituted by liquidity injections through reserve accumulation (Chart 11). Thus, in 
2002 and 2003, instead of planned net interventions, the Central Bank ended up with 
huge reserve accumulation. If the Government were as expansionary as it was 
                                                     
8 Central Bank of Armenia, 2004 annual report. 
9 The phenomenon of fiscal surpluses contributing to exchange rate undervaluation and 
reserve accumulation is also discussed in the literature (e.g., V. Polterovich and V. Popov, 
Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Long Term Growth).  
10 The term “surpluses” is used for the budget excluding PIUs. 
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planned, the Central Bank would have to sterilize the fiscal expenditures through 
massive foreign exchange sales thus leading to appreciation. In other words, the 
“surprise” fiscal savings prevented large scale foreign exchange sales and thus might 
have contributed to undervaluation of the exchange rate. 
In 2004, however, after two years of massive deposit accumulation the Government 
saved very little. (bold line in Chart 11). This fiscal shift affected the Central Bank’s 
ability to accommodate foreign exchange inflows: the Central Bank could not afford 
to be expansionary as the Government itself became expansionary. These changes in 
the Government’s fiscal stance and resulting reaction from the Central Bank may 
have increased the costs associated with keeping exchange rate undervalued.  
Retrospective estimates for 2002-2003 show that, assuming “no surprise surplus” 
scenario, foreign reserve accumulation would be by around cumulative AMD 40 
billion lower than the actual level. In other words, in such a scenario the Central 
Bank would need to sell extra USD 70 millions in the course of two years to observe 
its quantitative monetary targets. This would undoubtedly lead to appreciation of the 
exchange rate. In 2004, on the other hand, when the Government’s deposit 
accumulation practice was reversed the Government stopped helping the Central 
Bank in preventing exchange rate appreciation. 
3. Analysis of macroeconomic policies 
This section first analyzes the importance of the monetary policy for price dynamics with 
the view of making the case for effectively changing monetary policy objectives and 
claims that acceleration of inflation in 2003 and the later disinflation were policy 
phenomena. Second, the link between inflation and exchange rate will be analyzed, 
arguing that acceleration of inflation is associated with undervalued exchange rate while 
disinflation was associated with exchange rate appreciation.  
To test the importance of the monetary factor for inflation in the context of exogenous 
shocks the relationship between money and inflation was estimated for three time periods: 
the period preceding the wheat price shock, the period when the shock was affecting the 
economy and the period after the impact of the shock had died out. The regression results 
(Appendix 1) suggest a quite stable link between inflation (defined as CPI) and money 
(defined as Dram, or Domestic Currency Broad Money) over the three time periods as 
well as over the entire time period. The coefficient for dram broad money is significant at 
the 5% level and is almost the same for all three equations. Both CPI and dram broad 
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money were differenced to ensure stationarity and a seasonal moving average term was 
included to account for the seasonality of prices. 
These results suggest that inflation was largely a monetary phenomenon over the entire 
period regardless of the presence of external shocks. This supports the argument that the 
monetary stance between Q3 2002 and Q3 2003 was not consistent with an inflation target 
of 3 percent. Still, capturing and quantitatively estimating the impact of the wheat price 
shock on inflation is complicated by several factors. Most importantly, the shock was 
followed by rapid adjustments in the exchange rate in 2004 which changed the cost 
structure of inflation. Unfortunately this does not allow to come up with a quantitative 
estimate as to what inflation would be in 2003 if there were no shock. The following 
section uses CPI and relative price variability analysis to estimate the inflation caused by 
monetary factors.  
Further examining the link between inflation and the exchange rate requires establishing a 
relationship between the two variables. Cointegration and Vector Error Correction were 
used to test the hypothesis that high inflation was associated with undervaluation of the 
exchange rate and disinflation was associated with exchange rate appreciation. This 
exercise put together CPI, money and the exchange rate (defined as USD/AMD nominal 
exchange rate). 
Prices, exchange rate and money are non-stationary in levels but are stationary in first 
differences (see table 2 of the appendix). As the results of the Johansen test indicate, these 
three variables are co-integrated. (See table 5 of the appendix). The co-integration test 
indicates one co-integrating equation with a lags interval of 1 in first differences and a 
linear deterministic trend. This allows to estimate the long term relationship between 
inflation, money and exchange rate through a Vector Error Correction model. The results 
of the VEC are reported in table 6 of the appendix. The first column represents the 
equation for d(cpi). The coefficients are in line with the above discussed logic: the 
coefficients of both money and exchange rate are significant. The second and third 
equations are irrelevant for this analysis due to the use of lagged values of money and 
exchange rate. 
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4. Observations on CPI, Relative Prices and Money Velocity 
Using disaggregated monthly data of CPI components the impact of wheat price shock can 
be traced across the time. The “mechanical impact”11 of the shock on CPI can be traced 
back to June 2003, and this impact is felt until end - November 2004, as the last price hike 
in bread and cereals category caused by the international wheat price shock was observed 
in December 2003 (Table 7). It is important to note that data in column 4 do not constitute 
non-shock inflation, as they are derived simply by subtracting the contribution of bread 
inflation from CPI. These numbers do not account for changes in relative prices due to the 
shock. After the “mechanical” impact of bread inflation gradually is coming to its end, (in 
the second half of 2004), we see non-shock inflation from time to time exceeding 6 
percent. Moreover, inflation is high, reaching around 5 percent, even after the impact of 
the shock is exhausted, i.e. after November 2004 (Chart 8 and 9).  
The annualized average non-shock inflation for the second half of 2004 (compared to the 
same period of 2003) is 4.5 percent. This is an indication that in the time of rapid 
appreciation and disinflation, the non-shock inflation is still well above the Central Bank 
objective. Unfortunately this exercise cannot be used for estimating non-shock or non-
bread inflation for earlier periods, to see what inflation would be in 2003 without the 
supply shock. However, since it can be safely assumed that inflation was on decline 
throughout 2004, we can speculate that non-shock inflation at end-2003, early 2004 was 
probably higher than 4.5 percent. 
The second observation is related to relative price developments. The underlying idea is 
that when supply shocks affect the price of certain goods, then the behavior of the other 
goods’ prices depends on the extent to which monetary policy is flexible in terms of 
adjusting its targets. The impact of monetary policy on relative prices at times of external 
shocks can be viewed in the framework of the Cukeirman – Leiderman model (Cukierman 
and Leiderman, 1982). This model shows that relative price variability12 depends 
positively on the “lack of synchronization” between monetary policy and exogenous price 
shocks.  
In other words, if supply shocks are not accommodated by monetary expansion, the 
variability of other prices (prices of shock-free goods) increases, while in case of full 
monetary accommodation of the shocks increased variability of other goods’ prices is 
prevented. This model has been applied to the case of Armenia for the period of 1998-
                                                     
11 Assuming no change in bread and cereals prices. 
12 Relative price variability is measured by the variance of CPI components 
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2002 and was found effective in explaining sharp relative price fluctuations (Mkrtchyan, 
2004). 
Table 1 compares different monetary reactions to supply shocks in Armenia in the period 
of 1998-2004 and relative price variability. It illustrates the impact of “synchronization” 
between the shocks and monetary policy on price variability in different periods. 
Table 1 
  
Shocks, 
percentage in 
headline 
inflation Nature of  shocks 
Headline 
inflation 
Variability of non-
shock goods’ 
prices (based on 
Their variances) 
Growth rate of 
Reserve Money13  
1998 2.6 introduction of VAT on bread -1.3 75.2 3.3 
1999 6.6 
electricity tariffs, taxes on 
gasoline, tobacco 2 74.4 2.8 
2000 0.8 Gasoline 0.4 40.1 11.9 
2001 not identified - 2 60.6 23.3 
2002 not identified - 3 40.8 12.4 
2003 5.7 
Increase in international price 
of wheat 8.6 33.1 28.6 
2004 not identified - 2.3 43.7 10.4 
 
In 1999 the supply shock caused dramatic changes in relative prices and resulted in high 
relative price variability within the group of shock-free goods. In 2003, on the other hand, 
a shock of almost the same magnitude had a very different impact on relative prices, 
resulting in very low price variability. In the context of the described model this can be 
interpreted as a different policy response to the shocks and different tolerance to headline 
inflation. While in 1999 the Central Bank was firm on its low inflation target, in 2003 
monetary policy seemed to be loose enough to accommodate the shock and to prevent the 
growth of relative price variability. In other words, on the top of regular 3 percent 
inflation, quantitative monetary targets allowed to fully accommodate 6 percentage point 
supply-shock inflation, preventing any major relative price variability (Chart 10).  
On thing to note at this point is that the international wheat price shock was not anticipated 
at the time of monetary policy design. Monetary targets were set to achieve the objective 
of 3 percent inflation without any assumptions about possible shocks. In this respect the 
Central Bank’s objectives did not include preventing price variability and unnecessary 
                                                     
13 To capture the lagged impact of money on the CPI, Q4(t-1) through Q3(t) is used 
instead of calendar year. 
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short-term relative price changes. In this context, we can speculate that would there be no 
supply shock, inflation rate would be higher than projected 3 percent. 
The final observation is related to the developments in money velocity. Large supply 
shocks not accommodated by monetary expansion, should generally lead not only to 
higher price variability and relative price changes but also to higher velocity. In other 
words, since the external price shocks normally cannot be fully neutralized by adjustments 
in relative prices, certain increase in money velocity would be expected. However, what 
we observed in 2003 was a decline in money velocity, not an increase. This suggests that 
that money supply was large enough to accommodate the shock. 
4. Possible reasons for varying policies  
What could be the reasons behind possible changes in macroeconomic policies that could 
have caused exchange rate undervaluation in 2002-2003 and rapid appreciation since 
2004? Below three models of changing behavior of the monetary authority are discussed:  
inflation bias followed by disinflation, core inflation targeting to manage supply shocks, 
and information bias toward “official sources”. 
The years 2002 and 2003 were of high political importance as two general elections were 
held in highly competitive political environment of 2003. “Would be elected” incumbent 
authorities would want to prevent nominal appreciation and the resulting negative BoP and 
economic growth effects. Lincy foundation was another important component in the 
political landscape and could have played a crucial role for motivating the authorities to 
push for undervalued exchange rate or to prevent exchange rate from appreciating. A 
stable exchange rate was most likely a crucial factor for success in highly politicized 
Lincy project implementation. In this context, the fact that the exchange rate appreciations 
began right after the completion of Lincy Projects supports the argument for the “inflation 
bias” model.  
However, it would not be accurate to classify the Central Bank’s behavior as “dynamic 
inconsistency” as this term is used in the literature, since the Central Bank did not deviate 
a lot from its rules (in terms of intermediate quantitative quarterly targets) but it deviated 
significantly from its main objective, 3 percent CPI inflation. In this respect, 
“inconsistency” would apply to policy design, when targets at different times were based 
on different levels of tolerance to deviation of inflation from the stated objective.  
The Central Bank’s behavior can also be interpreted in terms core inflation targeting: 
namely, it can be argued that the Central Bank adjusted its policy to manage the external 
shock and to prevent changes in relative prices thus avoiding unnecessary price variability. 
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This would resemble the practice in countries with core inflation targeting, where central 
banks do allow shocks of certain magnitude to transform into headline inflation. Looking 
at the Central Bank’s historical performance, tight headline inflation targeting did not 
allow to mitigate large scale supply shocks of 1999 that were driven by adjustments of 
electricity tariffs and heavy taxes levied on gasoline and tobacco. In 2003, on the other 
hand, the international wheat price shocks, that were of similar magnitude as the shocks in 
1999 were handled was completely differently. While in 1999 the Central Bank’s reaction 
was monetary contraction that caused increased relative price variability, in 2003 the 
shocks were accommodated by expansionary monetary policy and relative prices were not 
affected. Thus, the Central Bank’s policy in 2003 can be described as opting for core 
inflation targeting instead of traditional headline inflation targeting14. 
However, if core inflation targeting was indeed the best model to describe the policy-
makers’ motivation in 2003, it would be difficult to explain the 2004 monetary program. If 
the Central Bank willingly accommodated a supply shock of 5.5 percentage point 
magnitude bringing headline inflation to just a little below of 9 percentages, 3 percentage 
headline inflation targeting for the next year would mean a radical disinflation. As the 
experience of most of core inflation targeting countries suggests Central Banks usually 
accommodate no more than around 2 percentage supply shocks, which allow them to 
come back to their headline inflations easily when the shock expires. In case of Armenia, a 
radical shift from 9 percent headline inflation to 3 percent would mean a very aggressive 
and thus very costly disinflation. 
Lastly, the policies could be affected by the information bias, namely relying only on 
official sources of information. As it was already mentioned, the Central Bank did not 
depart significantly from its quantitative monetary targets in 2003. However, these targets 
were generous, envisaging more than 25 percent money growth. At the time the 2003 
monetary policy program was being developed full information was available about the 
expected inflows from the Lincy foundations and therefore the risk of exchange rate 
appreciation was clearly recognized. Having this information about the expected flows and 
risks, the policymakers decided to set expansionary quantitative targets for money supply. 
In contrast, in the following year, when the Lincy foundation projects were over, policy 
makers could have felt little need to project accommodative monetary scenario, as they 
                                                     
14 This assumption can be supported by the following statement from 2003 Central Bank 
report: “…The Central Bank of Armenia refrained from measures that would completely 
absorb the impact of “bread products” group of commodities on inflation because it treated 
price stability as long term of objective (in view of possible decline of prices in the bread 
product group due to expectation of wheat supply in international markets growing back to 
the levels of previous years)”, page 8, 2003 Annual Report, CBA 
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believed that appreciation pressures will diminish once the Lincy flows are over. 
Obviously, what they may have overlooked was the potential for private inflows that soon 
proved to be as significant as the Lincy flows of previous year. If accurate, this 
explanation illustrates a high degree of dependence of monetary and macroeconomic 
programming on so called “official” information that could put the authorities in a position 
where they might overlook signals from more ambiguous private sector. 
5. Is the exchange rate still undervalued? A fiscal policy perspective 
Have the significant adjustment of 2004 and 2005 brought the Armenian Dram to its long 
run equilibrium, or does it still remain undervalued and more appreciation is yet to 
come15? This issue can be looked at from the point of view of Government’s inter-
temporal fiscal stance and its implication on the exchange rate.  
As it was argued above, the accumulation of fiscal deposits helped to prevent potential 
inflation, thus preventing more real appreciation. In other words if the fiscal savings are to 
be used as “stabilization” funds and will be spent when GDP is below its potential and 
external environment is unfavorable this is unlikely to cause major instability. One 
possible scenario is that the savings will be used sometimes in the distant medium-term as 
new Lincy and MCA funds as well as estimated expansion of regional economies will 
keep foreign exchange flowing to Armenia for another couple of years. However, if the 
Government will decide to use of these funds in an economic environment similar to the 
current one (high growth rate, favorable external environment) a surge in inflation may be 
the result in case if Central Bank deviates from its target or, there will be another wave of 
nominal appreciation in case the Central Bank stay firm about its target. In both cases 
rapid fiscal expansion will lead to real appreciation.  
Inter-temporal fiscal impact on the exchange rate, however, will become less relevant, if 
due to changing expectations and decline in dollarization, money demand will increase, 
and the Central Bank will be able to further monetize the economy without inflationary 
pressures. In fact, recent monetary data indicates that monetization is deepening16. 
Deepening monetization that follows rapid appreciation is observed in other transition 
countries as well. 
                                                     
15 According to IMF estimates the real exchange rate misalignment is still in magnitude of 
about 30 percent (IMF, MCD Regional Economic Outlook 2005) 
16 After money contraction of 2004, the Central Bank of Armenia is expansionary again 
with more than 50 percent annualized money growth rate as of Q4, 2005. This expansion 
is believed to be non-inflationary due to high growth of money demand.  
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6. Conclusion 
The central conclusion of this paper is that economic policies or the inter-temporal policy 
choices could have affected the dynamics of the exchange rate. In particular, in 2002-2003 
exchange rate appreciation was prevented by a mix of policies leading to undervalued 
exchange rate while the following policy reversal lead to rapid exchange rate appreciation.  
The paper finds that in 2002 and 2003 the Central Bank attached less priority to its 
inflation target as it was trying to be more accommodative of international flows. 
Monetary expansion, driven by large foreign exchange interventions prevented the 
appreciation and led to undervalued exchange rate in 2002 and 2003, meanwhile 
contributing to higher inflation. This behavior could have been the result of an inflation 
bias / short term prioritization of the economic growth, the attempt to manage large 
external price shocks or an information bias toward official sources. The period of 
interventionist monetary policy was followed by a period of “pay-off” with rapid 
disinflation measures that became inevitable when the Central Bank felt that inflation 
pressure were particularly strong.  
The paper also concludes that Central Bank’s active build-up of foreign reserves and the 
associated exchange rate undervaluation was also driven by Government surpluses that 
played a sterilization role for the Central Bank’s foreign exchange accumulation and 
delayed its inflationary pressure. 
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Appendix 
Chart 1: AMD/USD and AMD/EURO exchange rates, index, 
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Chart 2: For-ex interventions through inter-bank, quarterly, billion AMD
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Chart 3: For-ex interventions (Inter-bank and net-Government) and 
Exchange rate
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Chart 4: For-ex interventions (Inter-bank and net-Government) and 
exchange rate, annualized
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Chart 5: Interventions, Money Supply
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Chart 6: Private transfers, Capital transfers
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Chart 7: Dram Broad Money, 12 month growth rate, percent
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Chart 8: Headline inflation and contribution of the supply shock, 12-
month end-of-period, percent 
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Chart 9: Non-shock and headline inflations, 12-month end-of-period, 
percent
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Chart 10: Supply Shocks and "Non-Shock" Price Variability
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Chart 11: NFA and Government Liabilities
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Table 2. Stationarity Tests 
            
 Levels  First Differences 
 T-statistics P-values  T-statistics P-values 
            
      
CPI 2.16 0.99  -1.73 0.08 
DRAMMONEY -1.10 0.92  -11.98 0.00 
USD 0.26 0.99  -7.94 0.00 
            
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression: CPI before the shock 
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M08 2003M05  
Included observations: 58 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations  
Backcast: 1997M08 1998M07   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.022654 0.317027 -0.071457 0.9433 
DDRAMMONEY(-6) 0.000133 5.67E-05 2.338152 0.0230 
MA(12) 0.859689 0.023033 37.32360 0.0000 
R-squared 0.562991     Mean dependent var 0.263793 
Adjusted R-squared 0.547099     S.D. dependent var 1.899741 
S.E. of regression 1.278486     Akaike info criterion 3.379568 
Sum squared resid 89.89893     Schwarz criterion 3.486143 
Log likelihood -95.00748     F-statistic 35.42771 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.390924     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Inverted MA Roots  .95+.26i      .95-.26i    .70-.70i  .70+.70i 
  .26+.95i      .26-.95i   -.26+.95i -.26-.95i 
 -.70-.70i     -.70-.70i   -.95-.26i -.95+.26i 
 
Table 4: Regression: CPI at the time of shock 
 
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 2002M01 2003M12   
Included observations: 24   
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations  
Backcast: 2001M01 2001M12   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.238828 0.605184 0.394637 0.6971 
DDRAMMONEY(-6) 0.000170 7.75E-05 2.190706 0.0399 
MA(12) 0.825120 0.094694 8.713519 0.0000 
R-squared 0.623259     Mean dependent var 0.466667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.587379     S.D. dependent var 2.878053 
S.E. of regression 1.848734     Akaike info criterion 4.183348 
Sum squared resid 71.77419     Schwarz criterion 4.330605 
Log likelihood -47.20018     F-statistic 17.37061 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.323078     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000035 
Inverted MA Roots  .95-.25i      .95+.25i    .70+.70i  .70-.70i 
  .25+.95i      .25-.95i   -.25-.95i -.25+.95i 
 -.70+.70i     -.70+.70i   -.95+.25i -.95-.25i 
Table 5. Regression CPI for the entire period, 1998-2004 
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1998M08 2004M12  
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Backcast: 1997M08 1998M07   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.147923 0.281145 0.526144 0.6004 
DDRAMMONEY(-6) 6.94E-05 3.71E-05 1.872422 0.0651 
MA(12) 0.895964 0.021744 41.20458 0.0000 
R-squared 0.588612     Mean dependent var 0.272727 
Adjusted R-squared 0.577493     S.D. dependent var 2.098598 
S.E. of regression 1.364100     Akaike info criterion 3.497049 
Sum squared resid 137.6969     Schwarz criterion 3.588366 
Log likelihood -131.6364     F-statistic 52.93934 
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Durbin-Watson stat 1.477645     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted MA Roots  .96+.26i      .96-.26i    .70+.70i  .70-.70i 
  .26-.96i      .26+.96i   -.26+.96i -.26-.96i 
 -.70-.70i     -.70-.70i   -.96-.26i -.96+.26i 
 Table 6: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M08 2004M12   
Included observations: 77 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: CPI DRAMMONEYL5 USDL2    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.344157  45.03049  42.91525  0.0302 
At most 1  0.087995  12.54927  25.87211  0.7725 
At most 2  0.068415  5.456789  12.51798  0.5321 
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.344157  32.48122  25.82321  0.0057 
At most 1  0.087995  7.092478  19.38704  0.8944 
At most 2  0.068415  5.456789  12.51798  0.5321 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
CPI DRAMMONEYL5 USDL2 @TREND(98M02)  
-0.348827  6.34E-05 -0.032251  0.037628  
-0.021196  0.000106 -0.013978 -0.083224  
-0.055384 -1.87E-05  0.014881  0.064834  
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
D(CPI)  0.989399 -0.044415  0.075649  
D(DRAMMONEYL5)  328.7204 -1023.148  827.3066  
D(USDL2)  0.421481 -0.934873 -1.112508  
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -1129.493  
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Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
CPI DRAMMONEYL5 USDL2 @TREND(98M02)  
 1.000000 -0.000182  0.092456 -0.107871  
  (5.9E-05)  (0.03050)  (0.07967)  
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(CPI) -0.345129    
  (0.05772)    
D(DRAMMONEYL5) -114.6664    
  (193.288)    
D(USDL2) -0.147024    
  (0.21893)    
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -1125.947  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
CPI DRAMMONEYL5 USDL2 @TREND(98M02)  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.071104 -0.259787  
   (0.05214)  (0.05875)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -117.4569 -835.6929  
   (233.091)  (262.619)  
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(CPI) -0.344187  5.80E-05   
  (0.05780)  (2.0E-05)   
D(DRAMMONEYL5) -92.97974 -0.087789   
  (189.004)  (0.06688)   
D(USDL2) -0.127208 -7.25E-05   
  (0.21593)  (7.6E-05)   
 
 
Table 7: Vector Error Correction Estimate 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates  
 Date: 12/16/05   Time: 20:57  
 Sample (adjusted): 1998M08 2004M12 
 Included observations: 77 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1   
CPI(-1)  1.000000   
    
DRAMMONEYL5(-1) -0.000182   
  (5.9E-05)   
 [-3.10546]   
    
USDL2(-1)  0.092456   
  (0.03050)   
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 [ 3.03112]   
    
@TREND(98M01) -0.107871   
  (0.07967)   
 [-1.35398]   
    
C -137.0241   
Error Correction: D(CPI) D(DRAMMONEYL5) D(USDL2) 
CointEq1 -0.345129 -114.6664 -0.147024 
  (0.05772)  (193.288)  (0.21893) 
 [-5.97911] [-0.59324] [-0.67155] 
    
D(CPI(-1))  0.474718  438.4691  0.537100 
  (0.08208)  (274.835)  (0.31130) 
 [ 5.78393] [ 1.59539] [ 1.72536] 
    
D(DRAMMONEYL5(-1))  0.000122 -0.347481 -4.49E-05 
  (3.4E-05)  (0.11408)  (0.00013) 
 [ 3.58535] [-3.04604] [-0.34729] 
    
D(USDL2(-1))  0.056922 -17.82088  0.436023 
  (0.02985)  (99.9651)  (0.11323) 
 [ 1.90674] [-0.17827] [ 3.85086] 
    
C  0.054547  1319.639 -0.069516 
  (0.16915)  (566.420)  (0.64157) 
 [ 0.32247] [ 2.32979] [-0.10835] 
 R-squared  0.546454  0.125856  0.214974 
 Adj. R-squared  0.521257  0.077292  0.171361 
 Sum sq. resids  151.8076  1.70E+09  2183.839 
 S.E. equation  1.452046  4862.283  5.507368 
 F-statistic  21.68728  2.591571  4.929178 
 Log likelihood -135.3924 -760.3467 -238.0421 
 Akaike AIC  3.646555  19.87913  6.312781 
 Schwarz SC  3.798751  20.03133  6.464976 
 Mean dependent  0.272727  1042.104  0.042857 
 S.D. dependent  2.098598  5061.838  6.050085 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.35E+09  
 Determinant resid covariance  1.11E+09  
 Log likelihood -1129.493  
 Akaike information criterion  29.83099  
 Schwarz criterion  30.40933  
Table 8, CPI decomposition 
1 2 3 4 
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12 months end of 
period headline 
inflation 
Shocks, 12 month 
end of period 
Non-shock inflation, 
12 months end of 
period 
January-03 3.88  3.88 
February-03 3.04  3.04 
March-03 3.19  3.19 
April-03 2.69  2.69 
May-03 2.19  2.19 
June-03 4.14 2.16 1.98 
July-03 3.59 2.15 1.44 
August-03 4.34 2.16 2.18 
September-03 7.59 3.87 3.72 
October-03 6.95 3.85 3.10 
November-03 6.95 3.85 3.10 
December-03 8.60 5.50 3.10 
January-04 6.93 5.42 1.51 
February-04 7.91 5.47 2.44 
March-04 8.72 5.51 3.21 
April-04 7.87 5.46 2.40 
May-04 7.76 5.46 2.30 
June-04 6.17 3.25 2.92 
July-04 9.54 3.35 6.19 
August-04 9.43 3.35 6.08 
September-04 6.01 1.61 4.40 
October-04 6.22 1.62 4.61 
November-04 4.77 1.59 3.17 
December-04 1.98  1.98 
January-05 4.86  4.86 
February-05 4.65  4.65 
March-05 3.40  3.40 
April-05 1.25  1.25 
May-05 0.25  0.25 
June-05 -1.05  -1.05 
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